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23 April 2007

James Atkinson's Congressional testimony: http://cryptome.info/0001/cg-leakage.htm
Amendment 2: http://cryptome.info/0001/cg-ugly.htm


Date:	Sun, 22 Apr 2007 18:15:10 -0400
To:	John Young <jya[at]cryptome.net>
From:	"James M. Atkinson" <jmatk[at]tscm.com>
Subject: Amendment One to "Coast Guard Leaky Ships" Testimony


According to documents which the Coast Guard provided to the 
Committee (mere hours before the hearing) the Coast Guard confessed 
that during the Bluewater projects the Coast Guard only provided one 
standard or specification was provided to Lockheed Martin in regards 
to the this series of ships being required to protect classified 
information was "MIL-HDBK-232, Red/Black Engineering - Installation 
Guidelines.", and that there were zero... get this... ZERO other 
TEMPEST requires, measurements, or guidelines listed in the contract spec.

In turn this allowed LM to deliver nothing of value in regards to 
TEMPEST, but wait, it gets even worse. Lockheed Martin even ignored 
the requirements of MIL-HDBK-232, so that when they delivered the 
ships they were not in compliance with even the single TEMPEST 
related specification they were given as part of the contract.

In the "Certificate of Conformance" the contractor (ICGS and 
Lockheed) lie and say the ships complies with all standard when it 
fact it does not, and they knew it did not, and at the same time they 
were busy trying to silence the engineering team who was raising hell 
and blowing-the-whistle because they knew that Lockheed was cheating 
the government and lying in official documents. In turn the engineer 
alerted the government as to what Lockheed was doing, and Lockheed 
got caught playing games, and in turn it was discovered that the 
Coast Guard was asleep at the wheel and letting the contractors do 
what the Coast Guard SHOULD have been doing.

It was amazing listening to Lockheed tap dance around the issue at 
the hearings, and listen to them claim one thing when their own 
documents show that they were not telling the truth, and what the 
Coast Guard says is different from what the Coast Guard says, and 
both versions of the story are a significant deviance from reality.

Instead of the Coast Guard providing several dozen common TEMPEST and 
related COMSEC specification to Lockheed in the contract they 
provided just one. Lockheed knew, or should have known that this was 
not right, but instead of telling the CG that something was wrong 
they encouraged their people to stay quiet.

All Coast Guard ships, all ICGS, and all Lockheed projects should be 
considered "high risk" until everything can be proven otherwise.

-jma

--------------

Amendment One

At an absolute minimal, these ships should have rigorously adhered to 
the following government standards in concerning TEMPEST and their 
associated disciplines. These standards should have been adhered to 
from the date the first drawings were prepared until the current time.

NSA-82-89, NACSIM 5000, TEMPEST Fundamentals, National Security Agency.


NACSIM 5004, Tempest Countermeasures for Facilities within the United 
States, National COMSEC Instruction


NACSIM 5005, Tempest Countermeasures for Facilities outside the 
United States, National COMSEC Instruction, NACSIM 5005


NACSIM 5009, Technical Rational: Basis for Electromagnetic 
Compromising Emanations Limits


NACSIM 5100A Compromising Emanations Laboratory Test Requirements, 
Electromagnetics. National Security Telecommunications and 


Information System Security (NSTISS)


NACSIM 5108, Receiver and Amplifier Characteristics Measurement Procedures


NACSIM 5109, TEMPEST Testing Fundamentals


NACSIM 5112, NONSTOP Evaluation Techniques


NACSIM 5201, TEMPEST Guidelines for Equipment System Design


NSA 82-90, NACSIM 5203, Guidelines for Facility Design and RED/BLACK 
Installation, National Security Agency


NSA 65-5, NACSIM 5204, RF Shielded Acoustical Enclosures for 
Communications Equipment: General Specification, National Security Agency


NSA 65-6, NACSIM 5204, R.F. Shielded Enclosures for Communications 
Equipment: General Specification, National Security Agency


NSA 73-2A, NACSIM 5204, National Security Agency Specification for 
Foil RF Shielded Enclosure, National Security Agency


NSA 89-01 (Draft), NACSIM 5204, National Security Agency 
Specification for a High Performance Shielded Enclosure, National 
Security Agency


NCSC 3, TEMPEST Glossary


NTISSI 4002, Classification Guide for COMSEC Information


NTISSI 7000, National Telecommunications and Information Systems 
Security Instruction, TEMPEST Countermeasures for Facilities.


NTISSP 300, National Telecommunications and Information Systems 
Security Policy, National Policy on the Control of Compromising Emanations


NSTISSAM TEMPEST 1-92, Compromising Emanations Laboratory Test 
Requirements, Electromagnetics. National Security Telecommunications 
and Information System Security (NSTISS)


NSTISSAM TEMPEST 1-93, Compromising Emanations Field Test 
Requirements Electromagnetics


NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2-91, Compromising Emanations Analysis Handbook, 
National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security 
Advisory Memorandum


NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2-92, Procedures for TEMPEST Zoning


NSTISSAM TEMPEST 2-95, RED/BLACK Installation Guidance, National 
Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Advisory 
Memorandum


NSTISSAM TEMPEST 3-91, Maintenance and Disposition of TEMPEST Equipment


INFOSEC System Security Products & Services Catalog, October 1990, 
National Security Agency


DOD Directive C-5000.19, Control of Compromising Emanations


MIL-STD-461E, Department of Defense Interface Standard, Requirements 
for the Control of Electromagnetic Interference Characteristics of 
Subsystems and Equipment.


MIL-STD-IB8-124B, Military Standard Grounding, Bonding and Shielding 
for Common Long Haul/Tactical Communication Systems including Ground 
Based Communications-Electronics Facilities and Equipment.


MIL-HDBK-232, Red/Black Engineering - Installation Guidelines.


MIL-HDBK-411A, Long Haul Communications (DCS), Power and 
Environmental Control for Physical Plant.


MIL-HDBK-419, Grounding, Bonding, and Shielding for Electronic 
Equipment and Facilities.


MIL-HDBK-1195, Radio Frequency Shielded Enclosures


MIL-STD-188-124, Grounding, Bonding, and Shielding for Common Long 
Haul and Tactical Communications Systems.


MIL-STD-285, Method of Attenuation Measurement for Enclosures, 
Electromagnetic Shielding for Electronic Test Purposes.


FCC 47CFR, Radio Frequency Devices.


MIL-STD-464, Electromagnetic Environmental Effects Requirements for Systems.


MIL-STD-469, Radar Engineering Interface Requirements, 
Electromagnetic Compatibility Metric.


MIL-STD-1542B, Electromagnetic Compatibility and Grounding 
Requirements for Space System Facilities.


MIL-HDBK-235/1B, Electromagnetic (Radiated) Environment 
Considerations for Design and Procurement of Electrical and 
Electronic Equipment, Subsystems and Systems.


MIL-HDBK-237B, Electromagnetic Environmental Effects on Platforms, 
Systems, and Equipment.


MIL-HDBK-241B, Design Guide for EMI Reduction in Power Supplies.


MIL-HDBK-1512, Electroexplosive Subsystems, Electrically Initiated, 
Design Requirements and Test Methods.


MIL-HDBK-1857, Grounding, Bonding and Shielding Design Practices.


OPNAVINST C5510.93E, Navy Implementation of National Policy on 
Control of Compromising Emanations


AR 380-19-1, Control of Compromising Emanations, September 1990 (Army)


ANSI/IEEE C63.2, Standard for Instrumentation-Electromagnetic
Noise and Field Strength, 10 kHz to 40 GHz, Specifications


ANSI/IEEE C63.4, Standard for Electromagnetic Compatibility, 
Radio-Noise Emissions from Low Voltage Electrical and Electronic 
Equipment in the Range of 9 kHz to 40 GHz, Methods of Measurement


ANSI/IEEE C63.14, Standard Dictionary for Technologies of 
Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC), Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP), and 
Electrostatic Discharge (ESD)


ANSI/NCSL Z540-1, General Requirements for Calibration Laboratories 
and Measuring and Test Equipment


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