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15 August 2006

Source: https://ekm.netwarcom.navy.mil/netwarcom/nnwc-nipr/ncms/guides/alcoms/04306.txt


UNCLAS  //NO2280//

ALCOM 043/06

COMMO - ENSURE SEPARATE COPY TO EKMS MANAGERS

MSGID/GENADMIN/NCMS WASHINGTON DC/-/MAY/2006//

SUBJ/ELECTRONIC KEY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (EKMS) TREND ANALYSIS

UPDATE #1/2006//

POC/B. SEMPLE/CDR/NCMS WASHINGTON DC/-/TEL:DSN:857-9938

/TEL:COMM:240-857-9938/EMAIL:NIPR:BERNADETTE.SEMPLE(AT)NAVY.MIL/

EMAIL:SIPR:BERNADETTE.SEMPLE(AT)NAVY.SMIL.MIL//

POC/H. ROYAL/GG-13/NCMS WASHINGTON DC/-/TEL:DSN:857-7807

/TEL:COMM:240-857-7807/EMAIL:NIPR:HAYWOOD.ROYAL(AT)NAVY.MIL/

EMAIL:SIPR:HAYWOOD.ROYAL(AT)NAVY.SMIL.MIL//

POC/M. PIECHURA/LCDR/NCMS WASHINGTON DC/-/TEL:DSN:857-7703

/TEL:COMM:240-857-7703/EMAIL:NIPR:MICHAEL.PIECHURA(AT)NAVY.MIL/

EMAIL:SIPR:MICHEAL.PIECHURA(AT)NAVY.SMIL.MIL//

POC/R. BYRD/ENS/NCMS WASHINGTON DC/-/TEL:DSN:857-7808

/TEL:COMM:248-857-7808/EMAIL:NIPR:RICHARD.BYRD1(AT)NAVY.MIL//

POC/P. JOHNSON/GG-13/NCMS WASHINGTON DC/-/TEL:DSN:857-7706

/TEL:COMM:240-857-7706/EMAIL:NIPR:PAMELA.JOHNSON(AT)NAVY.MIL//

EMAIL:SIPR:PAMELA.JOHNSON(AT)NAVY.SMIL.MIL//

RMKS/



1. THIS ALCOM IS THE FIRST IN A SERIES OF MESSAGES FOR

CALENDAR YEAR 2006 THAT WILL PROVIDE EKMS MANAGERS WITH UPDATES

ON SIGNIFICANT TOPICS IN THE EKMS/COMSEC ARENA. THIS UPDATE

WILL IDENTIFY COMMON TRENDS SEEN VIA COMSEC INCIDENT MESSAGES,

CMS ADVICE & ASSISTANCE (A&A) 18-MONTH TRAINING VISITS AND 

TROUBLE CALLS TO DCMS WASHINGTON DC.



2. OVER THE PAST 3 YEARS, THE DISCIPLINE AND RIGOR OF COMSEC

ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT HAVE ATROPHIED, AND THE NUMBER OF COMSEC 

INCIDENTS/PRACTICES DANGEROUS TO SECURITY (PDS) HAS INCREASED.



THE FOLLOWING STATISTICS ARE PROVIDED:



2003 - 350 COMSEC Incidents

2004 - 424 COMSEC Incidents/72 PDS's

2005 - 493 COMSEC Incidents/99 PDS's



3. THE FIRST CALENDAR YEAR 2006, DEPARTMENT OF NAVY (DON) COMMANDS

REPORTED 109 COMSEC INCIDENTS TO NSA AND/OR DCMS FOR EVALUATION. 

76 WERE NOT ATTRIBUTED TO COMBAT SITUATIONS/AIRCRAFT MISHAPS

AND ARE DISCUSSED BELOW. STATISTICS AND TRENDS:



A. STATISTICS



    1. LOST/MISSING MATERIAL: 35 

    2. UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS: 15

    3. LOSS OF CONTROL/ACCOUNTABILITY: 13

    4. USE OF WRONG KEYING SEGMENT: 5

    5. USE OF SUPERCEDED KEYING MATERIAL: 4

    6. UNSECURED VAULT: 4



B. TRENDS



    1. LOST/MISSING MATERIAL. THE MAJORITY OF THE LOSSES OCCUR 

AT THE LOCAL ELEMENT. MAJORITY OF THE MATERIAL REPORTED 

LOST ARE HAND-HELD RADIOS AND OTHER PORTABLE DEVICES. WITHIN THE

LOCAL ELEMENT COMSEC MATERIAL CHANGES HANDS MANY TIMES AT WATCH

TURNOVERS. THE EXCHANGES ARE NOT DOCUMENTED OR TRACKED. THE LOSS

IS DETECTED WHEN AN INVENTORY OR SPOT CHECK IS HELD. AT THE 

WATCHSTATION: ESTABLISH OR RE-EMPHASIZE PROCEDURES THAT REQUIRE

EXCHANGES OF COMSEC MATERIAL BTWN WATCHSTANDERS TO BE DOCUMENTED

IN THEIR LOGBOOKS. IMMEDIATELY REPORT PROBLEMS TO THE CHAIN OF

COMMAND.



    2. UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS. NUMBER ONE CAUSE: SECURITY CLEARANCE 

DISCREPANCIES. THE EKMS MANAGER/COMMAND SECURITY MANAGER MUST

WORK TOGETHER TO ENSURE INTERIM CLEARANCES ARE CHECKED; EXPIRED

CLEARANCES ARE DETECTED; AND ALCON IN THIS PROCESS ARE SHARING

INFORMATION.



    3. LOSS OF CONTROL/ACCOUNTABILITY. NUMBER ONE CAUSE: SHIPPING 

VIOLATIONS (USE OF WRONG SHIPPING METHOD OR IMPROPERLY PREPARED

PACKAGES). ENSURE SHIPMENTS OF COMSEC MATERIAL ARE PROPERLY 

ADDRESSED, SEALED, CONTAIN SF-153 PAPERWORK, AND CLEARED 

PERSONNEL ARE HANDLING THE MATERIAL WHEN THE BOXES ARE TURNED

IN FOR SHIPMENT, OR OPENED UPON RECEIPT. 



    4/5. USE OF THE WRONG KEYING SEGMENT/USE OF SUPERCEDED

KEYING MATERIAL ARE RELATED. ENSURE WATCHSTANDERS HAVE CURRENT

EFFECTIVE/SUPERCESSION INFORMATION, STATUS BOARDS ARE CURRENT,

AND EQUIPMENT IS LABELED WITH CORRECT CIRCUIT INFORMATION. 



    6. UNSECURED VAULT: NUMBER ONE CAUSE: ONE PERSON, ACTING

ALONE, FAILS TO SPIN COMBO DIAL OR CHECK DOOR.

4. THE FOLLOWING WERE OBSERVATIONS BY CMS A&A TEAMS DURING

18-MONTH TRAINING VISITS AND WHILE ANSWERING PHONE CALLS.



A. COMMANDING OFFICER'S UNANNOUNCED SPOT CHECKS ARE NOT BEING

CONDUCTED. REFER TO EKMS 1, ANNEX D (THE COMMANDING OFFICERS

EKMS HANDBOOK). COMMANDING OFFICERS AND EKMS MANAGERS 

MUST ENSURE THAT THESE SPOT-CHECKS ARE CONDUCTED AT LEAST

QUARTERLY.



B. EKMS ALTERNATE MANAGERS NOT INVOLVED WITH THE ACCOUNT. 

ALTERNATE MANAGERS ARE JOINTLY RESPONSIBLE TO HIS/HER 

COMMANDING OFFICER FOR THE PROPER MANAGEMENT AND SAFEGUARDING

OF COMSEC MATERIAL HELD BY THE COMMAND. REFER TO EKMS 1, ART 

460.



C. UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO COMSEC MATERIAL. ACCESS TO              

CLASSIFIED COMSEC MATERIAL REQUIRES A SECURITY CLEARANCE 

EQUAL TO OR HIGHER THAN THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE MATERIAL

INVOLVED. ADDITIONALLY, ACCESS LISTS ARE NOT BEING 

UPDATED. ACCESS LISTS MUST BE UPDATED WHENEVER THE 

STATUS OF AN INDIVIDUAL CHANGES OR AT LEAST ANNUALLY. 

EKMS 1, ART 505 (d)(2) PERTAINS.



D.  EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN/EMERGENCY DESTRUCTION PLAN NOT 

UPDATED RANKS NUMBER ONE THIS QUARTER. EKMS MANAGERS ARE 

RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTAINING A WRITTEN AND UP TO DATE EAP/EDP

PLAN FOR THE SAFEGUARDING OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL IN THE EVENT

OF AN EMERGENCY (I.E. NATURAL DISASTER, TERRORIST ATTACK 

OR HOSTILE ACTION).  



GUIDELINES ARE PROVIDED IN EKMS 1, ANNEX M.



E. EKMS MANAGERS ARE NOT MAINTAINING THEIR FILES. EACH EKMS

ACCOUNT WILL ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN THE FOLLOWING 

COMSEC-RELATED FILES: CHRONOLOGICAL FILE, CORRESPONDENCE/

MESSAGE AND DIRECTIVES FILES, GENERAL MESSAGE FILE AND LOCAL

CUSTODY FILE. REFER TO EKMS 1, CHAP 7, PARA 703.



F.  VISITOR LOGBOOK ENTRIES.  A VISITOR LOG BOOK IS REQUIRED

TO BE MAINTAINED FOR A MINIMUM OF ONE YEAR. ALL PERSONS NOT

ON THE LOCAL ACCESS LIST SHOULD BE RECORDED IN THIS LOG.



G.  LMD/KP PLATFORM MAINTENANCE.  MAINTENANCE FUNCTIONS ARE 

REQUIRED TO BE COMPLETED ON A REGULAR BASIS. 

REFER TO EKMS 1, ANNEX W, PARA 10 (T), ANNEX W, PARA 10 (W) 

AND ART 1185, PARA E.



H. ACCOUNTABILITY RE-INIT 1 AND 2 KEYS. BOTH KEYS ARE 

REQUIRED TO BE ENTERED INTO LCMS IAW ALCOM 060/03 AND 

EKMS 1, ART 1185(d). 



I. KP CHANGEOVERS ARE NOT BEING PERFORMED. KP CHANGEOVERS 

MUST BE CONDUCTED EVERY 3 MONTHS. FAILURE TO PERFORM A KP 

CHANGEOVER IS A NON-REPORTABLE PDS. REFER TO EKMS 1, 

ART 1005(a)(11)(a).



J. EKMS MANAGERS ARE NOT VERIFYING THE COMPLETENESS AND 

ACCURACY OF SF 153'S. THE ACCURACY OF ACCOUNTING REPORTS

IS AN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT ASPECT OF ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT.

PRIOR TO FORWARDING A REPORT, THE COMPLETENESS AND 

ACCURACY OF INFORMATION MUST BE VERIFIED. REFER TO EKMS 1,

ANNEX T, PARA 4.



K. IMPROPERLY COMPLETED SF-700'S. THE NAME(S) AND ADDRESSES

OF THE INDIVIDUAL(S) AUTHORIZED ACCESS TO THE COMBINATIONS

MUST BE RECORDED ON THE FRONT OF THE ENVELOPE. SEE RECALL

IS NOT AUTHORIZED ON THE FRONT OF THE SF-700 FORM. REFER

TO EKMS 1, CHAP 5, PARA 515 (f).



5. MANY OF THE DISCREPANCIES IDENTIFIED ABOVE CAN BE FOUND

AND RESOLVED DURING A ROUTINE CMS A&A TRAINING VISIT. THESE

TRAINING VISITS ARE A GOOD WAY FOR COMMANDING OFFICERS TO

BE SURE THAT THEIR EKMS ACCOUNTS ARE BEING MANAGED PROPERLY

AND ARE HIGHLY RECOMMENDED PRIOR TO THE REQUIRED 24 MONTH

EKMS INSPECTION.



6. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CAN BE OBTAINED FROM THE LISTED

POCS OR FROM YOUR SERVICING CMS A&A TEAM.



7. THIS ALCOM IS CANCELLED FOR RECORD PURPOSES 31DEC06.//