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30 May 2001
Source: Hardcopy from US Army Intelligence and Security Command in partial response to FOIA request. Received May 25, 2001.

See related FOIA request: http://cryptome.org/inscom-foia.htm and other information: http://cryptome.info/inscom-foia01.htm


[2 pages.]

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

May 11, 2001

Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

Mr. John Young
CRYPTOME
251 West 89th Street
Suite 6E
New York, New York 10024

Dear Mr. Young:

This responds to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of March 29, 2001, for records concerning various dossiers. Your request was received in this office on May 7, 2001.

We have conducted checks of the automated Defense Clearance and Investigations Index and a search of the Investigative Records Repository to determine the existence of Army intelligence investigative records responsive to your request.

We have located the enclosed records pertaining to Disinformation Directed Against U.S., File Number ZF010858W. We have completed a mandatory declassification review in accordance with Executive Order 12958. As a result of this review, it has been determined that the information contained in these records no longer warrants classification protection and is releasable to you. A copy is enclosed for your use. Fees for processing this request have been waived.

Coordination has been completed and we have been informed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that their review disclosed information that is exempt from public disclosure pursuant. to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1) and (b)(3) of the FOIA. To aid you in identifying the CIA exempted information, we have bracketed it in black.

The withholding of the information by the CIA constitutes a partial denial of your request and you have the right to appeal this decision to the Agency Review Panel within 45 days from the date of this letter. If you decide to file an appeal, it should be forwarded to the following: Ms. Kathryn I. Dyer, Information and Privacy Coordinator, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC 20505. Please explain the basis of your appeal. Cite CIA #F96-2198 assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

We are continuing to review other titles you have requested and will respond to you by separate correspondence when our review is complete.

If you have any questions concerning this action, feel free to contact Mrs. Reilly at (301) 677-4742. Please refer to case 4795F-01.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Russell A. Nichols
Chief, Freedom of Information/ Privacy Office


Enclosure


[28 pages composed of several documents each with pages as noted.]

THIS MUST REMAIN TOP DOCUMENT

DOSSIER NO. ZF010668
[Number ZF010868 in cover letter above.]



As of   6 JUNE 80   all material
(Date)        

included in this file conforms with

DA policies currently in effect.

Lois E. Ward       6 JUNE 80  
   (Signature)      (Date Signed)

LOIS E. WARD           7          
   (Printed Name)    (Grade)



rowan   9 Dec 92



THIS MUST REMAIN TOP DOCUMENT



IC Form 315
1 Sep 72


[1 page form omitted: TRANSMITTAL OF MATERIAL TO IRR, IA (HQ) Form 2201, dated 30 May 1980.]


CONFIDENTIAL

7 Oct 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Surfacing of Bogus Document in Foreign Embassy, Bangkok (C)

1. (C) On 6 October 1976, undersigned proceeded to State Dept, C & 22d Sts, and met with Mr. Don Arabian, Soviet Desk Officer, State Department Security Office, who gave the undersigned the attached documents for our disposal. He stated that the documents came from the US Embassy in Bangkok, who received the "TS" document and the envelope and letter from the Philippine Embassy. Arabian stated that LTC Harvey, OACSI, has been able to determine after checking with various Army agencies that the TS document is not authentic. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxqs are aware of all the findings and State Dept Security has been coordinating their activities with them. Currently, State Dept has not been doing anything actively here in DC. USEMB, Bangkok is conducting local investigations to the extent of interviewing people in the embassy who discovered the envelope, postal delivery people, etc.

2. (C) For your information, LTC Harvey, Security Div, OACSI, has been the action officer. GEN Aaron is aware of the situation as is Mr. Merrill Kelly. As mentioned in para 1 above, LTC Harvey has been able to determine, after checking with various Army agencies, that there is no FM 30-31B, and that therefore, the attached document is not authentic. The bogus FM 30-31B, the letter and the envelope have been turned over to xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Obata
OBATA



[Stamp]
(b)(1) per CIA
5 USC 552a (b) (3)



[Stamp]
Classified by CDR, L. C. SAINTA
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY     2          
DECLASSIFY ON    31 Dec 96          

CONFIDENTIAL


[2 pages. Text poor, spelling is best guess.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

OFFICE OF SECURITY
SEP 2 1976
SPECIAL ASSIGNMENTS STAFF

CONFIDENTIAL           SY0196

PAGE 01[-02]         BANGKO   24319   2112337

47
ACTION SY-95

INFO  OCT-21   190-96   SYE-32   996W

--------------------     1178F6

P 2 111227 SEP 76
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3644
INFO AMEMBASSY MANILA PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BANGKOK 26319

SY CHANNEL

DEP FOP SAS FROM RSO

MANILA FOR AMBASSADOR AND RSO ONLY

E.O. 11652:  SDS
TAGS: ASEG
SUBJECT: COMPROMISE OF TOP SECRET MATERIAL

REF: BANGKOK 26132

[All upper case of body text converted to upper-lower.]

1. On September 21 RSO was contacted by Col. Bueno who stated he wanted to correct previous information provided during his September 18 interview (see REFTEL). Source was interviewed at the Philippine Embassy. He stated that he had questioned Embassy personnel further concerning the alleged Top Secret document discovered on September 16. He provided corrected testimony as follows. Source stated that at approximately 0720 hours on September 16 the Thai, live-in, male janitor, Fayed Chaiyuth Pimpat, had picked up the envelope containing questionable documents from the mailbox located at the exit of the Philippine Embassy. The janitor normally checks this mailbox early in the morning when he goes out to pick up the local newspapers which are left in a newspaper delivery box directly on top of the mailbox. Source stated that this is the normal procedure for the janitor to follow and he performs this function each morning. The janitor removed the envelope from the mailbox, noted that it was addressed to H.E. President Ferdinand E. Marcos, C/O H.E. Manuel T. Yan, Ambassador of the Republic of the Philippines, 768 Sukhunvit Road, Bangkok, took it into the Embassy and left it on the receptionists's desk. The receptionist was not present at this time. At 0745 hours the receptionist, Miss Sivaporn Sujirarpongsin, a Thai national and one-year employee of the Embassy, arrived at her desk. The receptionist sent the envelope and other items to C&R at about 1030 hours via messenger. The messenger, Mr. Prasong Pimpat, a Thai national and bother of Shaiyuth Pimpat, took the envelope and other message traffic to C&R, where it remained until about 1430 hours when C&R clerk Rene Canlas noted it and brought it to the attention of the Ambassador. The Ambassador then sent the envelope and its contents to Co. Bueno. Source stated that he then opened the envelope and examined its contents. The remainder of the information previously reported is correct.

2. During today's meeting Bueno requested authorization from his Ambassador to turn over to RSO all the documents he had received and the envelope. The Ambassador agreed. Bueno asked that the results of any technical examination and evaluation be made available to him as they were also an interested party.

3. Police C.I.D. checks of Chaiyuth Pimpat, Sivaporn Sujirarpongsin, and Prasong Pimpat are pending.

4. On September 26 Mr. Mongkol Patprasert, Assistant Chief Postmaster, Bangkok 11, Prakhanong District, stated that two regular postmen are permanently assigned for mail deliveries to the Philippine Embassy. The deliveries are made during morning and afternoon hours, and the mail is generally delivered in a bundle.

5. On the same date Mr. Ruangchai Dejphan and Mr. Nopadol Nanhard, assigned to the mail delivery route covering the Philippine Embassy examined a photograph of the envelope and stated that they had not made delivery of that item to the Philippine Embassy. All deliveries are made in a secured bundle and delivered directly to the Thai receptionist of the Embassy.

Investigation continuing.

BURKE



CONFIDENTIAL


[3 pages. Some text illegible, spelling is best guess.]

Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET   9565

PAGE 01[-03]           BANGKO 26132  01 of 02  296956Z

12
ACTION SY-95

INFO  OCT-21  ISO-80   SYE-92  SSO-92  /896 W

--------------------     895773

0 220916Z SEP 76
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3549
INFO AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 BANGKOK 26132

SY CHANNEL

DEPT FOR SAS FROM RSO
MANILA FOR AMBASSADOR AND RSO ONLY

F.C. 11652:  XGDS-2
TAGS: ASEC
SUBJECT: COMPROMISE OF TOP SECRET MATERIAL

REF: STATE 231596

[All upper case of body text converted to upper-lower.]

1. At approximately 1430 hours September 18 RSO, accompanied by Lt. Col. Stephen Alpern, AARMA, met Col. Amante S. Bueno, Armed Forces Attache, Philippine Embassy, at his residence located at 48 Soy Ruam Rudee, Ploenchit Road, Bangkok. RSO informed Col. Bueno that the reported Top Secret document received by the Philippine Embassy appeared to be false and we were conducting an investigation into this matter and requested his assistance in determining how the document came into his possession. Begin statement.

A. Col. Bueno stated that at approximately 0700 hours on September 18 Rene Canlas, a young male Filipino and records clerk at the Philippine embassy, arrived at the entrance to the Embassy and noticed in the bulletin board located at the front of the Embassy a large brown manila envelope addressed to H.E. President Ferdinand E. Marcos, C/O H.E. Manuel T. Yan, Ambassador of the Republic of the Philippines, 768 Sukhunvit Road, Bangkok. Source stated that Canlas brought the envelope to the attention of the Ambassador, stating he wished to send it out immediately via pouch to the Philippines. However, the Ambassador informed him that the envelope should be turned over to the Defense Attache's Office to be checked because of the threat of it possibly being a letter bomb. Bueno saw the envelope early the same afternoon, opened it, examined its contents, and found it contained a small white envelope with a letter addressed to H.E. President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Malacanang Palace, Manila, Republic of the Philippines. In addition, it contained a Xerox copy of U.S. Department of the Army Field Manual FM-30-31, Stability Operations - Intelligence, printed in January 1970. The field manual did not have the hard cover, but the cover page had also been reproduced by a Xerox machine. The package also contained a document listed as FM-30-31B Top Secret, Supplement B to FM-30-31. This document too appeared to be a Xerox copy of an original document. The brown manila envelope enclosing the documents has a 1 Baht 50 Satang stamp in the left-hand corner. Bueno stated he made a copy of the documents and then called Col. McGahee at the American Embassy. He was unable to locate McGahee and subsequently contacted Lt. Col. Ahern. He made arrangements to meet Alpern later on in the evening and at that time turned the documents over to him. Source stated that the Ambassador, the records clerk, and his administrative assistant were the only persons who had handled the documents. Source stated that only one copy of the documents was made. Source stated that he had prepared a report concerning the documents which would be sent via pouch to the Philippines and arrive middle of next week.

B. Source stated that he had no idea who may have delivered the documents as the normal deliveries are made by local postal service at approximately 0930 and 1530 hours. The postman generally brings the mail in and turns it over to the Embassy receptionist on duty inside the Embassy. Bueno stated that there is a local guard on duty on the premises up until approximately 0730 hours daily. He does not know if the guard observed the person or persons placing the documents in the bulletin board, but he will question the guard concerning this matter and apprise RSO of the results. Source stated that insofar as he knows they have never received any mail at the bulletin board.

C. Source stated that he has not recently conducted any discussion with members of host government or other government officials concerning the present negotiations over U.S. bases in the Philippines, although this has been a subject of some interest in the past in the local newspapers. He has not been subject to any inquiries from any other Embassies concerning this matter. Source stated that he has no idea as to who may have left the documents at the Philippine Embassy but he felt that it may have been an attempt to undermine the present U.S.-Philippines negotiations. He felt that a person leaving the documents at the bulletin board could accurately assume that one of the employees, either the records officer or one of the Defense Attache's staff, would observer the documents on his way into work and retrieve them. The records officer usually arrives at approximately 0700 hours as do two employees of his office. Source stated that he would request his Ambassador's permission to provide RSO with the original documents. End Statement.




SECRET


[2 pages. Some text illegible, spelling is best guess.]

Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET   9571

PAGE 01[-02]           BANGKO 26132  02 of 02  251103Z

12
ACTION SY-95

INFO  OCT-21  ISO-80   SYE-92  SSO-92  /806 W

--------------------     895834

0 250916Z SEP 76
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3549
INFO AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BANGKOK 26132

SY CHANNEL

DEPT FOR SAS FROM RSO
MANILA FOR AMBASSADOR AND RSO ONLY

[All upper case of body text converted to upper-lower.]

2. Alpern stated that DATT records reflect that Amante S. Bueno, DOB January 7, 1933, Philippine Armed Forces Attache and a colonel in the Philippine Constabulary, resides at 48 Soi Ruam Rudee, Ploenchit Road, Bangkok. He is married and has six children, four of whom reside with him and his wife in Bangkok. He has been assigned to Bangkok since August 1973 and is due to depart in November of this year. He attended the Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Alpern has know Bueno since August 1975 and describes him as intelligent, social member of the attache corps who entertains frequently and well but does not have an ostentatious standard of living. He has a reputation for being more than a moderate drinker, although Alpern has never seen him intoxicated. Source state that Bueno was a very close associate of Michael Jerushalmi, former Israeli military attache, and they had a reputation for hitting the night spots in Bangkok. Source stated that Bueno's wife is reportedly not in good health and often spent two to three weeks at a time in the Philippines. It is during these periods that Bueno allegedly is active in seeking out Bangkok night life. Source stated that Bueno appears to be pro-U.S. in his political views and does not believe he would have any reason to be involved in any disinformation attempt or in any attempt to discredit the U.S. Government.

3. The Philippine Embassy is located at 760 Sukhumvit Road, Bangkok. Its office hours are 0800-1700 hours Monday through Friday. Sukhumvit is a main Bangkok thoroughfare, and the Philippine Embassy's vehicular and pedestrian entrance opens directly to it, entrance is controlled by a gate, and there is a guard on duty at the inside of the entrance. The bulletin board is located on the left side of a wall enclosing the Embassy and next to the entrance gate. The bulletin board is secured by a single lock. It is used to post notices of interest to members of the Philippine community. The RSO is attempting to determine if the bulletin board was secure and locked at the time the envelope was allegedly left inside it. RSO has also requested Bueno to further question the records clerk, Rene Canlas, as well as the guard who was on duty that morning and other persons on the premises who may have noticed the envelope being delivered to or picked up from the bulletin board. As previously reported, the brown manila envelope (approximately 13 inches wide and 10 inches high) contained a 1 Baht 50 Satang stamp. However, there was no evidence that the envelope had been processed through the postal system. Had it been, it would have required approximately 6 Baht postage and would have been delivered into the premises and given to the local receptionist.

4. Investigation is continuing and RSO is awaiting results of Bueno's attempts to provide us with original documents. SRF has made photographs and preliminary examination of copies of documents originally provided Alpern.

5. Unless otherwise instructed, all documents obtained will be sent to SAS by next fast pouch September 24,. Investigation results will be sent telegraphically.

BURKE

SECRET


[2 pages duplicate preceding telegram.]


[2 pages. Text poor, spelling is best guess.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

OFFICE OF SECURITY
SEP 20 1976
SPECIAL ASSIGNMENTS STAFF

CONFIDENTIAL           SY0896

PAGE 01[-02]         BANGKO   26027   271145Z

47
ACTION SS-25

INFO  OCT-21   ISO-96   SSO-96  ASCE-96  IWRE-96,SYE 96, DODE-00

         CIAE-96

--------------------     85081

0 1711227 SEP 76
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3494
INFO AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE
DOD WASHDC IMMEDIATE
CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BANGKOK 26027

EXDIS

E.O. 11652:  GDS
TAGS: ASEG
SUBJECT: COMPROMISE OF TOP SECRET MATERIAL

REF: BANGKOK 25880

[All upper case of body text converted to upper-lower.]

1. At 1100 hours today Lt Col Alpern, AARMA, had further meeting with Col Bueno, DATT Philippine Embassy, to discuss the document reported REFTEL. In response to his question Bueno stated that in addition to the material he had previously provided us, he had also received in the same envelope a Xerox copy of Field Manual 30-31, Stability Operations - Intelligence, which is an unclassified document.

2. Bueno stated that the envelope of documents had been discovered at approximately 0700 hours September 16 in a glass enclosed bulletin board directly outside the Philippine Embassy. He made available to Alpern the envelope the documents were contained in which bore Thai postage stamps. However, Bueno did not feel that the material had been sent through the Thai postal system as the normal procedure is for the mailman to come into the Embassy to deliver mail and not to leave it at the bulletin board.

3. Bueno was initially under the impression that the Top Secret document was genuine and was surprised that the American Mission did not have a copy available to verify its authenticity. Alpern stated that we did not have a copy of such a document at the Mission. Alpern further advised that the document did not appear to be genuine but we are checking and would inform him as soon as we had positive results. Bueno did not comment what action he intended to take concerning the documents, but Alpern assumed that they would be forwarded to the Philippines and that some telegraphic notification may already have been sent.

4. Bueno did not seem particularly concerned about the portent of the documents but he did state that he thought they might be politically motivated and might be directed at disrupting present base negotiations in the Philippines.

5. Bueno provided Alpern with original envelopes the documents had been contained in and the original letter to President Marcos with the stipulation they be returned the same day. Documents were brought to Embassy, photographed, and returned to Bueno at 1600 hours this date. Investigation continuing.

BURKE



CONFIDENTIAL


[Envelope.]

Inclosure 2 to AR-BK-114-76

Personal/Confidential

His Excellency
President Ferdinand E. Marcos
Malacanang Palace
Republic of the Philippines


[1 page.]

September 14, 1976

His Excellency
President Ferdinand E. Marcos
Malacanang Palace
Republic of the Philippines

Dear Mr. President,

In 1974 I sent to Mr. Kukrit Pramoj, who is well-known to you and whom I deeply respect, some secret American documents revealing the dangers for the countries concerned of having U.S. troops and advisers stationed on their territories. Recent developments in Thailand suggest those documents were both timely and to the point for Mr. Kukrit Pramoj.

Now I am sending these documents to you in the hope that they will also be of use to your Government. I am doing this as one of an American group opposed to excessive U.S. military involvement in matters beyond the scope of reasonable American interest.

Respectfully

[No signature]


[12 pages. Same classifications on each page.]

UNCLASSIFIED

TOP SECRET

FM 30-31B

Supplement B
to FM 30-31

Headquarters
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C.
10 March 1970



STABILITY OPERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE - SPECIAL FIELDS

__________________



Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION

Chapter 2. BACKGROUND

General
Need for Political Flexibility
Characteristic Vulnerabilities of HC Regimes

Chapter 3. U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE TASKS

Identification of Special Targets
Recognition of HC Vulnerabilities
U.S. Army Intelligence Action

Chapter 4. INTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE

General
Recruitment for Intelligence Purposes
Assistance from U.S. Citizens Abroad
Penetration of the Insurgent Movement
Agents for Special Operations
U.S. Army Intelligence Advantages

Distribution List

GROUP-1
Excluded from
Automatic Declassification

(Reverse Blank)

_____________________________________________

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

_____________________

This TOP SECRET classified supplement FM 30-31B, owing to its specially sensitive nature, is not a standard issue in the FM series.

FM 30-31 provide guidance on doctrine, tactics and techniques for intelligence support of U.S. Army stability operations in the internal defensive environment. As it was intended for wide distribution, its contents were limited to matters directly concerned with counterinsurgency and with joint U.S. and host country (HC) operations to secure stability.

FM 30-31B, on the other hand, considers HC agencies themselves as targets for U.S. Army intelligence. It does not repeat the general intelligence guidance laid down in other documents, such as FM 30-31 and FM 30-31A. Its aim is limited to stressing the importance of HC agencies as a special field for intelligence operations and to indicating certain directions in which the procurement of information about the host country, in a manner more general than that required by straightforward counterinsurgency, may advance overall U.S. interests.

Operations in this special field are to be regarded as strictly clandestine, since the acknowledged involvement of the U.S. Army in HC affairs is restricted to the area of cooperation against insurgency or threats of insurgency. The fact that U.S. Army involvement goes deeper can in no circumstances be acknowledged.

The use of the term "HC agencies" in this supplement may be taken to mean, according to context:

a. The HC organization for internal defense operations.

b. The HC armed forces generally.

c. HC agencies other than the armed forces, e.g. the police and other civilian security agencies, national and local administrative bodies, propaganda organizations.

In other words, U.S. Army intelligence has a wide ranging role in assisting to determine the illegible counterinsurgency potential of the host country in all its aspects and the relation of that potential to U.S. policy. In pursuing its more specialist military objectives, it should not neglect the wider aspects of U.S. interests wherever opportunity offers to further them.

Distribution of this supplement is strictly limited to the addresses shown on the Distribution list. Its substance may be transmitted further to those selected in the discretion of the addressees as being well suited and well place to contribute to the end in view. Whenever possible, detailed instructions issued on the basis of this supplement should be passed on verbally, with strong emphasis on the particular sensitivity of this whole field of action.

CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND

_____________________

1. General

As indicated in FM 30-31, most recent insurgencies have taken place in developing nations or in nations newly emerged from former colonies.

U.S. involvement in these less-developed nations threatened by insurgency is part of the world-wide involvement in the struggle against Communism. Insurgency may have other than Communist origins, in tribal, social, religious, or regional differences. But, whatever its source, the fact of insurgency offers opportunities for Communist infiltration which, in the absence of effective countermeasures, may culminate in a successful Communist take-over. Therefore, the criterion determining the nature and degree of U.S. involvement in the political stance of the HC government in relation to Communism on the one hand and to U.S. interests on the other.

2. Need for Political Flexibility

The U.s. Army, in line with other U.S. agencies, is not committed irrevocably to the support of any particular government in the host country for a variety of reasons:

a. A government enjoying U.S. support may weaken in the war against Communist or Communist-inspired insurgency through lack of will or lack of power.

b. It may compromise itself by failing to reflect the interests of important sections of the nation.

c. It may drift into extreme nationalist attitudes which are incompatible with or hostile to U.S. interests.

Such factors may create a situation in which U.S. interests illegible of governmental direction enabling the host country to obtain more constructive benefit from U.S. assistance and guidance.

While joint counterinsurgency operations are usually and preferably conducted in the names of freedom, justice, and democracy, the U.S. government allows itself a wide range of flexibility in determining the nature of a regime deserving its full support.

Few of the less-developed nations provide fertile soil for democracy in any meaningful sense. Government influence, persuasive and brutal, is brought to bear on elections at all levels; traditions of autocratic rule are so deeply rooted that there is often little popular will to be ascertained.

Nevertheless, U.S. concern for world opinion is better satisfied if regimes enjoying U.S. support observe democratic processes, or at least maintain a democratic facade. Therefore, a democratic structure is to be welcomed always subject to the eventual test that it satisfies the requirements of an anti-Communist posture. It it does not satisfy these requirements, serious attention must be given to possible modification to the structure.

3. Characteristic Vulnerabilities of HC Regimes

In the light of the above considerations affecting U.S. policy, attention must be drawn to certain vulnerabilities inherent in the nature of most regimes in the less-developed nations.

a. In consequence of their backwardness or recent origin or both, the regimes against which insurgencies are directed usually suffer from restlessness and instability. Their leading political figures are often inexperienced, mutually antagonistic, and corrupt. When leaders of exceptional stature emerge, their efforts are often frustrated by government machinery ill-adapted to modern conditions and manned by inefficient and underpaid personnel.

b. These weaknesses give rise to a wide area of possible contacts between employees of government agencies and the insurgency. Having regard to the chronic instability of the regimes, the desire for reinsurances among their supporters against possible total or partial victory for the insurgency is widespread.

c. In most cases of internal conflict in the less-developed nations, both sides claim a monopoly of nationalistic purity. But the often unstable state and relatively overt character of U.S. support gives the insurgency some psychological advantage by laying the regime open to charges of puppetry. The frequent consequence is a growth of anti-American feeling among both the public and in general and among employees of the regime including the armed forces. Whether the armed forces are subservient to the regime or dominate it, they usually reflect its nature and share its vulnerabilities.

U.S. Army interest in the HC armed forces is not confined to a narrow professionalism: is was a illegible under political import. In most new and developing nations the armed forces play an important role in political life, and the illegible of that role is changed whenever a regime is confronted by armed illegible calling for military countermeasures.

CHAPTER 3

U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE TASKS

_____________________

4. Identification of Special Targets

U.S. Army intelligence is in a position to procure information over a wide range of HC government activity. But the specialist interests of the U.S. Army require that the major part of its intelligence effort be directed towards the HC army and related HC organizations for internal defense operations.

Special intelligence targets within the HC army include the well-placed personnel of:

a. Units at national and local level with which U.S. Army intelligence is in direct working contact.

b. Units at regional and local level with which U.A. Army intelligence, usually through the medium of its working contacts, can establish productive contact outside the limits of normal military activity.

c. Local units with which U.S. Army intelligence is no in contact, directly or indirectly, and which for that reason may be particularly vulnerable to political contamination from local insurgent sources.

d. Mobile units, such as Special Force units and Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols, which operate in areas under partial or intermittent control, and which therefore may also be vulnerable to such contamination.

In addition, to the HC army and its organization for internal defense operations, attention must be paid to the organization of the police.

The police generally stand closer to the local population than the army, and for that reason may be at the same time better sources of information and greater security risks. The security risks may become acute when police are drafted into the armed forces and replaced by recruits of less experience, training and ability.

U.S. Army intelligence operations directed towards the special targets listed above have several major objectives in view:

a. To guard HC army units against infiltration and influence from elements sympathetic to the insurgency or hostile to the United States.

b. To guard against the possibility of HC army personnel reinsuring their own future by developing active or passive contact with the insurgency.

c. To reduce corruption and inefficiency within HC army units to tolerable levels.

d. To assist in the promotion of HC officers known to be loyal to the United States.

e. To extend some forms of protection to all HC agencies falling within the filed of U.s. Army intelligence operations.

The achievement of these objectives calls for the timely recognition of vulnerabilities in HC agencies and for timely counteraction by U.S. Army intelligence.

5. Recognition of Vulnerabilities

The symptoms of vulnerability among HC agencies calling for investigation, identification and action by U.S. Army intelligence include:

a. Political instability, such as lukewarm attitudes towards the regime, sympathy with the insurgency, outright collaboration with the insurgency.

b. Anti-Americanism arising from exposure to insurgent propaganda, from friction between employees of HC and U.S. organizations at the personal or working level or from the too obvious presence of American personnel in the role of senior partners.

c. Blood relationships linking employees of the HC government with the insurgency. It is common practice for a family to deliberately to split its loyalties between the regime and the insurgency, so that whichever wins ultimately the family will have a foot in the right camp. Blood ties are of special relevance to police units, members of which often serve in their own home districts and are therefore exposed to pressure from families and friends.

d. Corruption, which exposes the individual to pressure from insurgent elements and, when it becomes general, undermines popular confidence in the regime, thus encouraging the spread of insurgency.

e. Inefficiency reaching a level at which it impedes the smooth flow of illegible and thus constitutes a form of direct assistance to the illegible. It may also illegible the insurgency: it is a well-tried form of administrative sabotage, being relatively easy to practice and relatively difficult to detect and identify as such.

6. U.S. Army Intelligence Action

U.S. Army intelligence must be prepared to recommend appropriate action in the event of symptoms of vulnerability persisting long enough to become positively damaging. Such action may include measures taken against individuals, or more general measures designed to put pressure on groups, agencies, or, in the last resort, on the HC government itself.

It is desirable that U.S. Army intelligence should obtain the active cooperation of the appropriate HC authority in pursuing punitive measures against HC citizens. But there are areas where combined action is frustrated by divergent or conflicting aims and interests, and where U.S. Army intelligence must defend the U.S. position against contrary forces at work in the host country.

This area of divergence or conflict is often entered in the matter of punitive action against individuals who may be protected by a tangle of personal, political and bureaucratic complications.

Action designed to influence or pressurize HC agencies or the government itself presupposes a situation in which U.S. interests are at stake. Measures appropriate to a given situation may be official or unofficial.

Official action is not relevant to the issues discussed in this document. But unofficial action involving clandestinity falls into the sphere of responsibility shared by U.S. Army intelligence with other U.S. agencies.

CHAPTER 4

INTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE

_____________________

7. General

The success of internal stability operations undertaken by U.S. Army intelligence in the framework of internal defense depends to a considerable extent on the degree of mutual understanding between American personnel and the personnel of agencies of the host country.

However, whatever the degree of mutual understanding between U.S. personnel and their HC opposite numbers, a more reliable basis for the solution of U.S. Army intelligence problems is the availability in HC agencies of individuals with whom U.S. Army intelligence maintains agent relationships.

Therefore, the recruitment of leading members of HC agencies in the capacity of long-term agents is an important requirement.

8. Recruitment for Intelligence Purposes

For the special purposes of U.S. Army intelligence, the most important field of recruiting activity is the officer corps of the HC army. In many less-developed nations, officers of the armed forces tend to be of propertied origin, conservative by virtue of family background and education, and therefore receptive to counterinsurgency doctrine. They are of special importance as long-term prospects because they not infrequently play a decisive role in determining the course of development in some of their respective countries.

The following categories require special attention with a view to long-term recruitment:

a. Officers from families of long-standing economic and cultural association with the United States and its allies.

b. Officers known to have received favorable impressions of U.S. military training programs, especially those who have been trained in the United States itself.

c. Officers destined for assignment to posts within the HC intelligence structure. These require special though not exclusive attention.

Standing directives to U.S. instructors at U.S. training establishments require the study of officers mentioned in sub-paragraph 2 (b) above from the point of view of political loyalty: of their immunity from Communist ideology and their devotion to the democratic ideals of the United States. The Secret Annex to the final training report on each HC officer passing through a U.S. training program contains an assessment of his prospects and possibilities as a long-term agent of U.S. Army intelligence.

Questions of recruitment are treated in greater detail in FM 30-31A where the general doctrine governing agent intelligence (HUMINT) is stated and elaborated. The directive laid down there should be applied to recruiting operations envisaging HC government agencies.

9. Assistance from U.S. Citizens Abroad

U.S. Army intelligence must take into account potential assistance from U.S. citizens working in the host countries, both as direct sources of information and as indicators of leads for the recruitment of HC citizens, official and otherwise, as long-term intelligence agents. Such U.S. citizens include officials working for agencies other than the U.S. Army, and U.S. businessmen, as well as representatives of the mass media, operating in the host countries.

10. Penetration of the Insurgent Movement

In FM 30-31 attention was drawn to the importance of HC agencies penetrating the insurgent movement by agent means with a view to successful counteraction. It was pointed out that there was a danger of insurgent agents penetrating HC mass organizations, government agencies, police, and military intelligence units with a view to the collection of secret intelligence. Stress was also laid on the probability that lack of information from HC agencies about insurgent activities in spheres where they are known to exist may indicate that insurgent agents have successfully penetrated HC agencies and are therefore in a position to anticipate government moves.

In this connection, U.S. Army intelligence should pursue two main lines of action:

a. It should endeavor to identify agents infiltrated into the insurgency by HC agencies responsible for internal security with a view to establishing clandestine control by U.S. Army intelligence over the work of such agents. (Operational records in such cases will illegible on the conditions prevailing in each country.)

b. It should endeavor to infiltrate reliable agents into the insurgent leadership, with special illegible on the insurgent intelligence system directed against HC agencies. It must be borne in mind that information from insurgent sources about the personnel of HC agencies might be of particular value in determining the proper conduct of U.S. Army intelligence and in suggesting timely measures to further U.S. interests.

11. Agents on Special Operations

There may be times when HC governments show passivity or indecision in face of Communist or Communist-inspired subversion, and react with inadequate vigor to intelligence estimates transmitted by U.S. agencies. Such situations are particularly likely to arise when the insurgency seeks to achieve tactical advantage by temporarily refraining from violence, thus lulling HC authorities into a state of false security. In such cases, U.S. Army intelligence must have the means of launching special operations which will convince HC governments and public opinion of the reality of the insurgent danger and of the necessity of counteraction.

To this end, U.S. Army intelligence should seek to penetrate the insurgency by means of agents on special assignment, with the task of forming special action groups among the more radical elements of the insurgency. When the kind of situation envisaged above arises, these groups, acting under U.S. Army intelligence control, should be used to launch violent or non-violent actions according to the nature of the case. Such actions could include those described in FM 30-31 as characterizing Phases II and III of insurgency.

In cases where the infiltration of such agents into insurgent leadership has not been effectively implemented, it may help towards the achievement of the above ends to utilize ultra-leftist organizations.

12. U.S. Army Intelligence Advantages

In the field of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) U.S. Army personnel enjoy the advantage of working closely at many levels with their opposite numbers in the national intelligence structure of the host country. By virtue of their generally superior training, expertise and experience, they are well qualified to get the better of any exchange arising from such cooperation, even in dealing with HC personnel who outrank them. This close cooperation enables U.S. Army intelligence to build up a comprehensive and detailed picture of the national intelligence structure.

Mention has been made in FM 30-31 of the desirability of establishing National Internal Defense Coordination Centers (NIDCC) and Area Coordinations Centers (ACC)  to integrate intelligence operations, administration and logistics into a single approach to the problem of insurgency.

This recommendation was designed to improve the effectiveness of the HC counterinsurgency effort. But it may also be used to facilitate U.S. Army intelligence penetration of the HC army as a whole. U.S. personnel attached to the NIDCC and ACC are well placed to spread their attention over the whole range of HC army organization, to embrace operations, administration and logistics as well as intelligence.

The establishment of joint central archives at the NIDCC should be used to assist the procurement of intelligence about the personnel of HC agencies, and the more selective archives kept at ACC level should serve the same purpose. Where the existence of separate HC archives are not officially accessible to U.S. personnel is known or suspected, careful consideration should be given to the possibility of operations designed to gain the desired assets.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

                                                            W.C. WESTMORELAND
                                                            General, United States Army
                                                            Chief of Staff

Official:
  KENNETH G. WICKHAM,
  Major General, United States Army,
  The Adjutant General.

Distribution: See page 13. [Not provided]


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